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In this paper, we contrast two dierent views in the debate on ocial dollarization. The
Mundell (1961) framework of optimal currency areas and a model on boom-bust cycles, by
Schneider and Tornell (2004), who take account of credit market imperfections prevalent in
middle income countries. We highlight that the role of the exchange rate is strikingly dierent
in the two models. While in the Mundell framework the exchange rate is expected to smooth
the business cycle, the other model predicts that the exchange rate plays an amplifying role.
We empirically evaluate both models for eight highly dollarized Central American economies,
and nd that the main benet of ocial dollarization derives from avoiding a mismatch between
foreign currency liabilities and domestic revenues, as well as the boom-bust episodes that are
likely to follow from it. Using a new method of Cubadda (1999, 2007), we furthermore test for
cyclical comovement and reject the hypothesis that the countries form an optimal currency area
with the United States according to the Mundell denition.
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1 Introduction
Unocial dollarization has increased substantially over the past decade in Central America and in
several countries the 50% mark has been crossed in recent years. There is a high degree of de facto
dollarization1 and the issue of ocial dollarization has therefore become an important part of the
discussion on stabilization policy. Recently, for instance, one of the presidential candidates of the
Costa Rican elections of February 2010, Otto Guevara, proposed to dollarize the economy ocially,
a proposal that is also supported by the ex president of the central bank, Eduardo Lizano, and
further politicians and academics. The issue of ocial dollarization is also an important part of the
policy debate in many of the other Central American countries, of which Panama and El Salvador
already have the US Dollar as an ocial currency since 1904 and 2001.2
Despite the increasing political discussion, there is so far only little empirical evidence on the
economic cost and benet of a dollarization policy in Central American countries.3 Partly, this
may be due to the lack of an easy to use comprehensive empirical framework to address the issue of
dollarization and its implications for stabilization policy. So far, most of the literature has used the
Mundell (1961) model of optimum currency areas.4 In a seminal paper Bayoumi and Eichengreen
(1993) have proposed a method to empirically measure the degree of business cycle comovements, in
order to assess optimal currency areas, that can also be used to address the issue of xed exchange
rate regimes or full dollarization. Applying a procedure to decompose temporary and permanent
shocks in a time series, the authors identify demand shocks as the transitory component of GDP.
They nd that the correlation among the demand shocks is not very high in the European Union
and conclude that Europe might not be an optimum currency area (OCA), according to the OCA
model of Mundell (1961). Related trend/cycle decompositions have been used for Central America
by Fiess (2007), who also primarily focuses on the contemporaneous correlation of shocks, when
evaluating the scope for macroeconomic policy coordination in Central America.
In our view, this approach provides only incomplete information to policy makers for several
reasons. On the one hand, there may be permanent demand shocks or temporary supply shocks. It
is therefore useful to also investigate the full time series in growth rates, rather than focusing on the
1See Figure 3.
2For example Berg, Borensztein, and Mauro (2002); Temprano-Arroyo (2003); Salvatore (2001); Alesina, Barro, and
Tenreyro (2002) propose dollarization of the economies.
3Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) give a review of the issue of dollarization; and Mishkin and Savastano (2001)
give an overview of monetary policy options for Latin America, including currency boards and dollarization.
4An overview of the Mundell model is given in De Grauwe (1994). A formal analysis of exchange rate regime choice,
based on the correlation of shocks, is also given in Berger, Jensen, and Schjelderup (2001).How Strong is the Case for Dollarization in Central America? 2
transitory elements only. More importantly, on the other hand, the contemporaneous correlation
of the transitory component (or the full time series) may not be sucient, as a basis for monetary
policy coordination or a common currency. Even when the correlation of shocks between two
countries is high, the response of each country to a shock - often interpreted as a business cycle -
can be very dierent. When one country reacts to and absorbs the shock more quickly than the
other, it remains dicult to implement a common stabilization policy.
In order to address this issue, we investigate in the rst part of our paper whether there exist
common cyclical reactions to a standard shock in the Central American countries and the USA,
using the test for common serial correlation that was rst developed by Engle and Kozicki (1993)
and Vahid and Engle (1993) and later extended by Cubadda (1999, 2007).5 The authors show that
it is possible to test for common serial correlation (i.e. a common business cycle) by constructing
a linear combination of the two time series (that each follow an AR(p)-process) that is free of
autocorrelation. If it is feasible to construct such a linear combination, it implies that there exists a
common AR(p)-structure, as well as a perfectly collinear response of two time series to a standard
shock.
The existence of such a common reaction to shocks would be an ideal precondition for ocial
dollarization in a Mundell (1961) framework.6 We will show, however, that this precondition is not
convincingly met in any of the countries we studied. Despite the relatively high contemporaneous
correlation of shocks, the dierent persistence of shocks would be a strong argument against ocial
dollarization, rather than for it.
In the second part of the paper, we argue that the optimum currency area framework of Mundell
(1961) also neglects some important characteristics of most middle income countries that may
change the dollarization debate substantially: The Mundell framework is build on the assumption
that a freely 
oating exchange rate would help to smooth asymmetric shocks. In the case of
idiosyncratic business cycles, the exchange rate could then contribute to stabilize the economy.
Schneider and Tornell (2004), however, argue that in the presence of credit market imperfections, a
free 
oating exchange rate would amplify the business cycle 
uctuations, rather than smooth them.
Their argument is that in the presence of enforceability problems, agents will nd it optimal to
undertake risk to overcome their credit constraints. Tornell and Westermann (2002) document that
5See Urga (2007) for an overview of recent developments in the literature of common features in time series.
6This approach has been also used in the context of the policy debate on a common currency in North-East Asia by
Cheung and Yuen (2005) (see section on further literature).N. Lindenberg and F. Westermann 3
many middle income countries have undertaken such risk by denominating their debt in US Dollars,
thereby taking advantage of the lower interest rates in foreign currency. The consequences for the
whole economy, when liabilities are denominated in foreign currency, is that a real appreciation
will reduce the value of the debt and allow the agents to take on even more debt during the
boom period. In the case of a depreciation, the value of the debt will increase and reduce the
scope to nance further investment. Contrary to the Mundell assumption, the exchange rate does
therefore not smooth the business cycle, but amplify it and generate the boom-bust cycle pattern
that is also characteristic for many Central American economies. In a currency crisis, a very large
depreciation, a large number of rms and banks can become bankrupt, in a partially dollarized
economy - a possibility that has rst been pointed out in the context of the dollarization debate by
Calvo (2001).
We document in the second part of our paper that several characteristics of countries with boom-
bust cycle patterns are present in Central America. A high dollarization of liabilities, relatively
weak judicial institutions and credit constraints, particularly for small rms, are present in all
countries. More subtle, but also informative - and an implication of the model on boom-bust cycles
- is the fact that in recent years, a real appreciation has coincided with a high credit growth rate
and an expansion of non-tradable sector's output relative to the tradable sector. Furthermore, most
countries have already experienced systemic banking and currency crisis over the past 20-30 years.7
Finally, we attempt to uncover the impact of exchange rate movements on domestic output
directly. Using a bivariate VAR, we nd that in Central American countries there is indeed a
positive reaction of GDP to an appreciation of the exchange rate and vice versa. We follow the
identication approach of Tornell and Westermann (2005) to derive the impulse response functions
and pool the reactions across countries in order to overcome the small sample problem. The evidence
is conrmed also, when considering Mexico, for which a longer time series exists.
Our main policy conclusion is that ocial dollarization could be an important tool to achieve
business cycle stabilization, but not because business cycles are similar to the US. In fact the
full impulse response pattern is quite dierent, even for countries where the contemporaneous
correlations are high. We argue instead that the main advantage derives from the fact that the
mismatch between foreign currency liabilities and domestic revenues, in particular for small, non-
7See Table A.4 in the Appendix, and also Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) who study nancial crises in Latin Amer-
ica. In a later paper the authors analyze the links between banking and currency crises, the so called twin crises
phenomenon (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999).How Strong is the Case for Dollarization in Central America? 4
tradable goods producing rms, can be avoided, as well as the pronounced cyclical movements and
nancial crisis that follow from exchange rate movements in its presence.
The next section contains the analysis of the dollarization question in the Mundell framework.
In section three, the empirical analysis is guided by the boom-bust cycle framework of Schneider
and Tornell (2004). Section 4 gives a review of the related literature, and the last section concludes.
2 Mundell-Framework
As a rst approach, we will analyze the dollarization question in the context of the optimum
currency area (OCA) framework (See Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), and Kenen (1969)). In
this framework, the main loss associated with dollarization is the loss of individual monetary policy
that helps to smooth asymmetric shocks. The more symmetric shocks are across countries, the
smaller is this potential welfare loss. Tests for comovements (Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993);
Fiess (2007) among others) of business cycles are therefore a main empirical tool to assess the costs
of policy coordination that a monetary union or an ocial policy of dollarization implies. In the
following subsections we analyze various forms of comovement and argue that the methods that
have been used so far only provide an incomplete picture for a reliable policy contribution.
2.1 The Data and Descriptive Statistics
The time series for the Central American countries, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama, GDP real indices (seasonally adjusted) are obtained
from the Latin American and Caribbean Macro Watch of the Inter-American Development Bank.
Equivalent data for the USA were retrieved from the International Financial Statistics Database of
the International Monetary Fund. For Guatemala we use the monthly index of economic activity
from Banco de Guatemala8 and for Honduras the monthly index of industrial production (real
and s.a.) from the Inter-American Development Bank.9 All series are re-based to 2001:1. In
the following analysis, logarithmized growth rates of GDP will be studied in the longest common
available sample, from 1997:1 to 2008:1.
Figure 1 displays the GDP series in levels and growth rates. The growth rates of Belize,
Honduras, and Nicaragua stand out highly volatile. In many countries there have been slightly
8Data have been seasonally adjusted with the Census X12 method.
9For both countries quarterly GDP is not available. However, we use these indices as proxies for GDP and we will
refer to both as "GDP" in the following.N. Lindenberg and F. Westermann 5
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Note: GDP levels and growth rates of the Central American countries are displayed in quarterly data from 1997:1 to
2008:1. The growth rates are displayed on the left axis (bar charts), the levels on the right axis (dashed lines).
Source: Authors representation, based on IADB (2010), Banco de Guatemala, and IMF (2010).
negative growth rates in 2000/2001, e.g. in Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico
and Panama. In the US growth has been nearly stagnating at this time. The common slowdown of
the countries in the post 2001-period provides a rst visual impression that some sort of comovement
across business cycles exists vis- a-vis the United States, and across Central American countries.
Other periods with negative rates that are more idiosyncratic, can be explained with the oc-
currence of occasional banking and/or currency crisis, as in the Dominican Republic in 2003 (twinHow Strong is the Case for Dollarization in Central America? 6
crisis), in Honduras in 1999 (banking crisis), and in Nicaragua in 2002 (banking crisis).10 On
average, however, the growth rates of the Central American countries have been relatively high
(compare Table 1) with mean growth rates between 3% and 6% annual growth. Many of the coun-
tries even have experienced boom-periods, prior to busts, with a maximum growth rate of more
than 10%, e.g. Belize, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Panama.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the GDP growth rates of Central American countries
Belize Costa Rica Dom. Rep.
El 
Salvador
Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama USA
 Mean 0.044 0.054 0.056 0.030 0.035 0.039 0.036 0.038 0.056 0.031
 Maximum 0.163 0.113 0.121 0.049 0.082 0.145 0.077 0.083 0.122 0.052
 Minimum -0.029 -0.003 -0.024 0.011 -0.012 -0.129 -0.017 -0.011 -0.004 0.004
 Std. Dev. 0.051 0.029 0.036 0.010 0.022 0.058 0.023 0.024 0.033 0.013
 Obs. 25 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
Note: Descriptive statistics of the GDP growth rates of the Central American countries are displayed in quarterly
data from 1997:1 to 2008:1 (the sample for Belize is shorter due to data availability).
Source: Authors calculations, based on IADB (2010), Banco de Guatemala, and IMF (2010).
In order to get a rst quantitative impression of the similarity of the business cycles in the
Central American countries and the USA, we look at the contemporaneous correlations of the GDP
growth rates that are displayed in Table 2.
Table 2: Contemporaneous correlations between the GDP growth rates of Central American
countries and the USA
Belize Costa Rica Dom. Rep.
El 
Salvador
Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama
Belize 1
Costa Rica 0.004 1
Dom. Rep. -0.375 0.446 1
El Salvador -0.350 0.696 0.691 1
Guatemala -0.474 0.155 0.257 0.247 1
Honduras 0.430 -0.130 -0.171 0.019 -0.370 1
Mexico -0.097 0.297 0.367 0.416 0.307 0.202 1
Nicaragua -0.035 0.241 -0.014 0.054 0.069 0.084 0.238 1
Panama -0.311 0.623 0.417 0.686 0.284 -0.191 0.320 0.108 1
USA -0.229 0.326 0.119 0.234 0.328 0.006 0.731 0.301 0.119
1997:1 - 2008:1 (pairwise samples )
Note: Contemporaneous correlations between the (logarithmized) GDP growth rates of Central American countries
and the USA are displayed. All pairwise samples with Belize are 2002:1 - 2008:1; the remaining samples start in
1997:1.
Source: Authors calculations, based on IADB (2010), Banco de Guatemala, and IMF (2010).
All GDP growth rates, excepting the Belizean one - which has a negative correlation with the
10Table A.4 in the appendix gives an overview of the systemic banking and currency crisis in Central America in the
last decades.N. Lindenberg and F. Westermann 7
US, and the growth rate of Honduras, where the correlation is nearly zero -, are positively correlated
with the GDP growth rate of the USA. The contemporaneous correlation between Mexico and the
US is with 0.73 especially high, which re
ects the close economic relationship between the two
NAFTA-countries.11 Among the remaining Central American countries, Costa Rica, Guatemala,
and Nicaragua have the highest correlations with 0.33 (0.33, 0.30), which are still signicantly
higher than the correlations between the US GDP growth rate and the German or Japanese ones
(0.26 and -0.01). The two dollarized economies Panama and El Salvador, however, have a weaker
correlation with the US, with a value of 0.12 and 0.23, respectively.12
This relatively high correlation of business cycles is often interpreted as a precondition being
fullled to introduce a policy of ocial dollarization at a relatively low cost in terms of stabiliza-
tion policy. Our rst main point is, however, that not only the correlation of shocks, but also
the reactions to the shocks over time are important. As a rst pass, we illustrate this point, by
displaying the autocorrelation functions of the GDP growth rates in Figure 2. Although in some
cases the reaction in the rst quarters is quite similar, we nd that after some time the functions
dier substantially, both with respect to the magnitude and to the length of the reaction that each
country has to a standard shock. Clearly this asymmetric adjustment will pose further diculties
for monetary policy under a common currency. In the following section, we will test more for-
mally, whether the rst visual impression is conrmed and cyclical reactions to shocks are indeed
signicantly dierent between the countries.
2.2 A Test for Common Cycles and Codependence
In this section we implement a formal test for various types of comovement between the Central
American economies and the United States. We start with the unusual preliminary exercises, on
the stationarity properties of the time series in levels and rst dierences and on cointegration. We
then conduct a test for common cycles between Central American countries and the United States,
using the test for common serial correlation, developed by Engle and Kozicki (1993). The intuition
for this test is the following: If both the rst dierences of country i and country j are stationary
AR(p) time series, a linear combination should exist that has a reduced AR(0) structure, if the
11The correlation between Canada and the US is quite similar with 0.77. Correlations among the Eurozone countries
are slightly smaller, e.g. among Germany and France 0.58 and among Germany and Italy 0.72.
12Goldfajn, Olivares, Frankel, and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) analyze the disadvantages and advantages of dollarization
on the example of Panama, one of the largest dollarized economies in the world, comparing the country especially
with Costa Rica and Argentina to control for idiosyncratic eects.How Strong is the Case for Dollarization in Central America? 8
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Panama
Note: The autocorrelation functions of the logarithmized growth rates of the GDP of the Central American countries
(solid line) and the USA (dashed line) are displayed in the sample 1997:1 - 2008:1.
Source: Authors calculations, based on IADB (2010), Banco de Guatemala, and IMF (2010).
reaction to shocks is the same across countries. Even if the contemporaneous correlation of growth
rates is quite high, as it was shown to be the case in several countries in the previous section, the
two countries do not need to respond similarly to shocks. We therefore argue that the application
of the test for common features - with regard to both trend and cycles in GDP - provides a more
complete picture to understand the comovements of business cycles across countries, and to evaluate
the potential costs of the loss of an autonomous monetary policy.
Stationarity As a rst preliminary analysis, we test for the stationarity of the time series, using
the Augmented-Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test:




jyt j + t;N. Lindenberg and F. Westermann 9
where yt = GDP at time t13, p = the lag parameter, t = an innovation term, and  is the rst
dierence operator. The lag parameter p is determined by the Schwarz information criterion (SIC)
and the nite sample critical values from Cheung and Lai (1995) are used. The results of the ADF
test are displayed in Table A.1 in the Appendix. For all countries, the null of non stationarity
cannot be rejected in levels and can be rejected in rst dierences, hence all series are I(1).14
Cointegration As a second step, we examine whether there exist common long run trends,
by implementing the test for cointegration using the Johansen (1988, 1991) maximum likelihood
approach, and allowing for an intercept in the cointegrating equations:




where Yt is a 21 vector of the GDP series,  is an intercept vector, and t is a vector of innovation
terms.
The canonical correlations between the least squares residuals of the two subsequent regressions
are calculated in order to deduce the maximum eigenvalue test statistic:








The null hypothesis of the maximum eigenvalue statistic claims that there are r, and the alter-
native hypothesis that there are r + 1 cointegrating vectors:
Maximum Eigenvalue Statistic =  T ln(1   r+1):
The critical values of Osterwald-Lenum (1992), corrected with the scaling factor of Cheung and
Lai (1993) to control for a possible nite-sample bias, are then compared with the calculated test
statistics.
The results are shown in Table A.2 in the Appendix. We nd that the GDP series of the
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are cointegrated with the US GDP.
13We do the test both in logarithmized levels and in logarithmized growth rates.
14For El Salvador the lag length of the ADF-test in rst dierences has been manually selected.How Strong is the Case for Dollarization in Central America? 10
For these countries, we include an error correction in the computation of the following test statistics
for common cycles.
Common Serial Correlation Finally, we conduct the test for common serial correlation. We
start with the two-stage least squares (TSLS) approach of Engle and Kozicki (1993). The rst
regression
yi;t = c + yj;t + t (1)
is estimated with TSLS, including as instruments all lagged variables of yi and yj
15, i.e. yi;t k and
yj;t k for k = 1;:::;p as well as the lagged error correction terms, ect k, where it is needed. (1;)
is the normalized common feature vector.16
Then, we analyze whether the estimated residual ^ t still contains autocorrelation that aects
the present values through the same channels as yi;t and yj;t by estimating the following equation:










kect k + ut: (2)
The null hypothesis is dened as all parameters being not statistically dierent from zero. If
all lagged variables do not explain the estimated residual, the common AR(p)-pattern has been







where T denotes the number of observations and k refers to the number of restrictions, i.e. the
number of exogenous variables including the constant. R2 is the R-squared of regression 2. Thus,
if the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, evidence in favor of a common cycle is established.
Results of the serial correlation common feature test (with TSLS estimation) are displayed in
panel A of Table 3. In column CF, we see that a serial correlation common feature is found only
for Nicaragua, where the null of a common feature cannot be rejected at the 1% or 5% level and
the serial correlation common feature vector is statistically signicant.
As a robustness check, we also conduct the test with an optimal general method of moments
15yi and yj refer to the logarithmized growth rates of GDP.
16In order to generate the best condition for nding cyclical comovement, we choose the most parsimonious lag
structure that is sucient to remove all autocorrelation from the residuals. However, using the AIC or SIC criterion
to choose the lag length does not change the results qualitatively.N. Lindenberg and F. Westermann 11
Table 3: Results of serial correlation common feature and codependence tests
PANEL A: TSLS
p C F 123
Costa Rica 2 test-statistic 6.57 *** 2.71
vector 0.20 ** 0.20 **
Dominican Rep. 1 test-statistic 69.71 ***
vector 0.04
El Salvador 1 test-statistic 66.80 ***
vector 0.30
Guatemala 1 test-statistic 16.43 ***
vector 0.55 ***
Honduras 
a) 9 test-statistic 9.70 *** 6.12 *** 4.71 *** 3.71 **
vector 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Mexico 3 test-statistic 3.17 ** 0.42 0.67
vector 0.44 *** 0.43 *** 0.43 ***
Nicaragua 1 test-statistic 0.59
vector 1.16 **
Panama 4 test-statistic 4.67 *** 2.54 ** 3.09 ** 3.04
vector 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
PANEL B: GMM
p C F 123
Costa Rica 2 test-statistic 27.64 *** 15.10 ***
vector -0.23 *** -0.15 **
Dominican Rep. 1 test-statistic 29.59 ***
vector -0.09
El Salvador 1 test-statistic 28.63 ***
vector -0.40 **
Guatemala 1 test-statistic 27.23 ***
vector -1.01
Honduras 
a) 9 test-statistic 33.62 *** 12.49 *** 6.30 * 2.66
vector -0.28 -0.43 -0.77 -2.22
Mexico 3 test-statistic 16.76 *** 6.62 2.19
vector -0.40 *** -0.37 *** -0.37 ***
Nicaragua 1 test-statistic 21.36 ***
vector -0.33 ***
Panama 4 test-statistic 27.79 *** 11.31 ** 8.23 2.29
vector -0.22 *** -0.26 *** -0.18 -0.36 ***
1997:1 - 2008:1 
Codependence of order
1997:1 - 2008:1 
Codependence of order
Note: Results of the TSLS estimation (panel A) and GMM estimation (panel B) of serial correlation common features
and codependence between the GDP growth rates of the Central American countries and the USA are reported for the
sample 1997:1 - 2008:1. In the rows test statistic F-statistics are reported in panel A and X
2-statistics are reported
for the GMM approach (panel B). The rows titled vector report the coecient  of the common feature vector. ***,
** indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis with a signicance of 1%, 5%. a) To test for a common feature with
Honduras, industrial production instead of GDP has been used for the USA.
Source: Authors calculations, based on IADB (2010), Banco de Guatemala, and IMF (2010).
(GMM) estimation as proposed by Cubadda (1999, 2007), who argues that GMM is more appro-
priate for testing for common cycles, due to its relative eciency. Panel B in Table 3, Column CF,
shows that with this alternative estimation method, none of the countries share a common serial
correlation feature with the United States.How Strong is the Case for Dollarization in Central America? 12
Codependence Some time series may have a dierent initial response to a shock, but a common
response after some lags. This weaker form of cyclical, but non-synchronized comovement, called
codependence, was rst described by Gourieroux and Peaucelle (1989) and Vahid and Engle (1997).
We test for codependence estimating the same equations as for the SCCF: 1. TSLS (equation 1)
and 2. OLS of the residual (equation 2). Then, we compute a Wald-Test, testing whether all but
the rst lagged terms of both interest rates do not explain jointly the estimated residual ^ t.
Codependence of order one, i.e. a synchronized reaction to a common shock after one period, is
found for Costa Rica and Mexico. The remaining countries reject the null hypothesis of a common
feature. Using the optimal GMM test proposed by Cubadda (1999, 2007), we can only conrm the
codependence of order one between Mexico and the US, and we nd codependence of order three
for Panama (see panel B in Table 3).
Interestingly, there is no obvious dierence between countries that intend to dollarize, and those
who already have ocially dollarized their economies, like Panama and El Salvador. This suggests
that there is not much endogeneity between the exchange rate regime and the degree of business
cycle comovement.
Finally, as a last robustness check, we disregard the requirement of common lag structures and
conduct the TSLS serial correlation common feature test with four lags in the estimation equations.
When conducting the test with 4 lags in each estimation equation, results remain qualitatively
unchanged (see Table A.3 in the Appendix). The only country for which we nd a robust evidence
in favor of codependence - that holds in all specications of the test - is Mexico.
3 Schneider/Tornell-Framework
Based on the results of the previous section an ocial dollarization of the Central American
economies seems to be associated with substantial costs, as asymmetric shocks, as well as com-
mon shocks with asymmetric persistence cannot easily be oset by domestic stabilization policy,
such as a depreciation against the US Dollar to stimulate exports. In this section we will show that
it is not clear, whether this indeed constitutes a welfare loss in the presence of credit market imper-
fections. Schneider and Tornell (2004) have proposed a conceptual framework, where dollarization
and currency mismatch arise as a consequence of contract enforceability problems and bailout ex-
pectations. In this model, the exchange rate plays just the opposite role. Rather than stabilizing
the business cycle, it amplies cyclical 
uctuations. In their model rms denominate their debt inN. Lindenberg and F. Westermann 13
foreign currency in order to overcome credit constraints. The revenues of the non-tradable goods
producing sector, however, are still in domestic currency. In this setting, a real appreciation reduces
the debt burden of the rms and allows them to take on even more debt, as their net worth has
increased. A real depreciation, on the other hand, leads to an increase of the debt burden and a
reduction in net worth. A very large depreciation - such as in a currency crisis - will therefore lead
to widespread bankruptcies. Overall, their model explains the patterns of boom-bust cycles that
many middle income countries have experienced over the past decades.
We will document in the following subsections, that several of the characteristics of middle
income countries that give rise to boom-bust cycle patterns are clearly present in the Central
American economies.







BLZ CRI DOM SLV GTM HND MEX NIC PAN
Note: Percentages of foreign-currency denominated liabilities in 2007 are reported. El Salvador has been dollarized
in 2001, Panama uses the US$ as currency since 1904.
Source: Authors representation, based on Caprio et al. (2008), Bank Regulation and Supervision Database, World
Bank.
Currency Mismatch Figure 3 displays the percentages of foreign-currency denominated liabil-
ities. Besides El Salvador and Panama, that use the US$ as ocial currency since 2001 (1904),
especially Costa Rica and Nicaragua display a high degree of unocial dollarization with percent-
age shares of 54.80% and 70.60%. In Honduras the de facto dollarization is still high with 41%.
The smallest degree of unocial dollarization can be observed in Mexico with only 17.06%.
In the model of Schneider and Tornell (2004), foreign currency nancing is the consequence of
institutional problems and credit constraints. Firms opt for a foreign currency loan that they can
obtain at a lower interest rate despite the associated risk, because they expect a bailout in case of
a systemic crisis.How Strong is the Case for Dollarization in Central America? 14
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Note: The indicator "rule of law" measures the extent to which agents have condence in and abide by the rules of
society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime
and violence. Indicators for 1998 and 2008 are reported. The range of the indicator is from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher
values corresponding to better governance outcomes.
Source: Authors representation, based on World Bank, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009).
Contract Enforceability Problems In Figure 4 the index rule of law, which measures the
extent to which agents have condence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality
of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence,
is displayed for the Central American countries and the US. The index varies from -2.5 to 2.5,
with higher values corresponding to better government outcomes. As can be seen easily, a high
discrepancy between the situation in the US and the Central American countries exists. In 2008
the index has the value 1.65 in the United States, followed by Costa Rica with a value of only 0.44.
The poorest outcome (-1.1) can be assigned to Guatemala. This dierence means, for example,
that enforcing contracts in 2008 took in the US about 300 days, in Costa Rica about 877 days, and
in Guatemala 1459 days17.
Credit Constraints The importance of credit constraints can be illustrated in a descriptive
analysis of enterprise surveys conducted by the World Bank among Central American rms. Table
4 shows in panel A the percentage of subgroups of nancial constrained rms and in panel B the
total number of rms (both constrained and not constrained). As the number of rms is rather
low, the interpretations have to be handled quite carefully. However, some general features can be
concluded from the data: Small rms are typically more credit constrained than medium and large
17Source: World Bank, AGI Data Portal, Doing Business.N. Lindenberg and F. Westermann 15
Table 4: Access to nancing
PANEL A: percentage of financial constrained firms
total small medium large exporter
non-
exporter T-sector N-sector
Costa Rica 73.76 74.79 66.15 80.56 78.26 72.63 73.52 77.27
Dom. Rep. 28.89 na na na 20.00 29.30 na na
El Salvador 24.24 30.88 24.80 11.04 21.60 25.05 27.41 17.70
Guatemala 18.97 26.22 14.74 11.21 12.82 20.74 22.56 12.89
Honduras 25.00 34.74 19.55 10.00 9.38 27.69 26.62 22.54
Mexico 18.51 20.24 16.96 16.55 18.92 18.47 20.07 12.85
Nicaragua 22.38 24.73 20.26 15.22 23.53 22.25 23.84 17.70
Panama 9.27 11.01 7.22 6.76 5.15 10.06 8.23 9.97
PANEL B: number of firms
total small medium large exporter
non-
exporter T-sector N-sector
Costa Rica 343 242 65 36 69 274 321 22
Dom. Rep. 225 na na na 10 215 na na
El Salvador 693 285 254 154 162 531 467 226
Guatemala 522 225 190 107 117 405 328 194
Honduras 436 213 133 90 64 372 263 173
Mexico 1480 736 448 296 148 1332 1161 319
Nicaragua 478 279 153 46 51 427 365 113
Panama 604 336 194 74 97 507 243 361
Note: The company-level data for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama are from
2006 and are based on the same standardized questionnaire. Data for Costa Rica and Dominican Republic are from
2005. However, the questionnaires dier. Company-level data for Belize (and also for the US) do not exist.
In panel A the percentage of nancial constrained rms and in panel B the absolute number of rms (i.e. the sum
of all rms in this category whether constrained or not) are displayed. A rm is dened as nancially constrained if
access to nancing, which includes availability and cost, is a major or a very severe obstacle. A rm is dened as small
if the number of employees lies between 5 and 19; as medium if the number is between 20 and 99; and as large if there
are more than 100 employees (for Costa Rica the denition diers: small: 1-30; medium: 31-100; large: more than
101). A rm is dened as exporter if less than 85% percent of the establishment's revenues are from national sales. A
rm is dened as T-sector-rm if the screener sector is manufacturing (i.e. foods, garments, textiles, machinery and
equipment, chemicals, electronics, non-metallic minerals, other manufacturing); and as N-sector-rm if the sector is
services (i.e. retail sale, IT, other services) or others (i.e. construction and transport) (for Costa Rica the denition
diers: a rm is dened as T-sector-rm if the percentage of revenues from the manufacturing sector is bigger than
the percentage of revenues from the sum of comercio, servicios and otros).
Source: Authors calculations, based on World Bank, Enterprise Surveys (2010).
rms, whereby a small rm is dened as having between 5 and 19 employees. In most countries,
non-exporting rms are more constrained than exporting rms, whereby a rm is dened as exporter
if less than 85 percent of its revenues are from national sales.
A Real Appreciation Another factor, that strengthens the risk for a boom-bust-cycle is a real
appreciation, as it raises the risk of a depreciation that would at the same time augment the credit
burden in the Central American country. As can be observed in Figure 5, that displays the realHow Strong is the Case for Dollarization in Central America? 16














Note: Real exchange rates vis- a-vis the US$ are displayed for the period 2005 - 2008. Data for Belize is quarterly;
for all other countries monthly data is used.
Source: Authors representation, based on IADB (2010), Latin American and Caribbean Macro Watch.
exchange rates vis- a-vis the US$, a real appreciation has taken place in almost all countries (with
the exception of Belize), especially since mid-2006. Thus, the fear of a reversal with a following
real depreciation is justiable.
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Note: (Average) annual growth rates of real domestic credit (in local currency) are displayed. Growth rates are
expressed in percentages. For comparison: the average annual growth rate in the US between 1997 and 2007 has
been 5.64%.
Source: Authors calculations, based on WDI (2010).N. Lindenberg and F. Westermann 17
Credit Growth The observed real appreciation is especially alarming, if the credit volume has
increased signicantly during the last years, as more agents would be exposed to a suddenly in-
creasing credit burden. Figure 6 shows the average annual growth rates of real domestic credit
between 1997 and 2007 as well as the growth rate of 2007.
Considering that the average annual growth rate of domestic credit has been about 5.64% in the
US in the same sample, credit has grown at a considerable rate in many of the Central American
countries. Particularly, in Costa Rica credit has grown enormously with an average rate of 12.38%
per year. Also in Belize, the Dominican Republic and Honduras credit growth has been remarkable
with an average of over 10% per year. However, there have been lending booms in all Central
American countries (excepting Mexico and Nicaragua) during the sample period.18 Especially
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Honduras have gone through sustained boom phases:
Costa Rica had a lending boom from 2000 to 2003, and 2005 to 2007, the Dominican Republic from
1997 to 1999, in 2001, and from 2005 to 2006, and Honduras from 1999 to 2000, in 2002, and from
2004 to 2006.
Sectoral Growth Middle income economies, experiencing boom-bust cycles, often display a very
unequal development of the tradable's and the non-tradable's sector. Typically, the non-tradable's
sector grows at a higher level than the tradable's sector. As can be observed in Figure 7, that
displays the share of the non-tradable sector in total gross value added, this is especially true for
Guatemala and Honduras. But also in Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic the share of the
non-tradable's sector has increased in the last years.
The Role of the Real Exchange Rate We conclude this section by directly estimating the im-
pact of real exchange rate movements on the business cycle. We implement a vector autoregressive
(VAR) framework, to which Tornell and Westermann (2005) have given a structural interpretation
in the context of a two-sector economy with contract enforceability problems and bailout expec-
tations. The bivariate VAR includes GDP and the real exchange rate. The estimation model
is




18A lending boom is dened for year t if the average annual growth rate of domestic credit of the years t and t+1 is
more than 10%.How Strong is the Case for Dollarization in Central America? 18



















































1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Note: The displayed line represents the share of the non-tradable sector in total gross value added. Tradable and
non-tradable sector sum up to 1. The tradable sector is dened by "Agriculture, hunting, forestry, shing (ISIC
A-B)" and "Mining, Manufacturing, Utilities (ISIC C-E)". The non-tradable sector comprises "Construction (ISIC
F)", "Wholesale, retail trade, restaurants and hotels (ISIC G-H)", "Transport, storage and communication (ISIC I)"
and "Other Activities (ISIC J-P)".
Source: Authors calculations, based on UN data (2010).








A. Impulse response functions are computed by inverting this
autoregressive model to the moving average representation.
Identication is achieved by the assumption that output in period t depends on investment in
period t   1, that is nanced by bank credit. The amount of lending, in turn, depends on the real
exchange rate. It is therefore assumed that the real exchange rate does not have a contemporaneous
eect on GDP, but GDP can eect the real exchange rate in the same period. Given this recursive
system the standard Cholesky decomposition can be applied.
The impulse response functions from this VAR are displayed in Figure 8. The graph shows the
reaction of Mexico, for which a much longer time series exists, as well as the average response from
the countries that have entered the previous common features analysis.19 We nd that in both cases
the reaction to a shock in the real exchange rate is clearly negative. About one to four quarters after
19Except Guatemala and Honduras, for which we did not have GDP data and used production indices in the common
feature part.N. Lindenberg and F. Westermann 19
















Note: The bivariate VAR includes GDP and the real exchange rate. The reaction of the GDP to a shock in the
real exchange rate is displayed for Mexico (solid line). Moreover, the average response from the countries that have
entered the previous common features analysis is reported (dashed line).
Source: Authors calculations, based on IADB (2010), Latin American and Caribbean Macro Watch.
an appreciation of the exchange rate, GDP will go up, and vice versa, a depreciation will trigger
a decrease in GDP. This pattern is clearly at odd with conventional assumptions of the stabilizing
role of the exchange rate in the Mundell model, but it can be rationalized in the alternative model
that includes credit market imperfections typically present in middle income countries.
4 Related Literature
Over the last ten years, several researchers as well as policy makers have given a recommendation
for ocial dollarization in Central America.20 Berg et al. (2002); Temprano-Arroyo (2003); and
Salvatore (2001) discuss the issue of dollarization in Latin America and conclude that the Central
American countries might be good candidates for a xed exchange rate with the USA. Alesina et al.
(2002), who test in a large set of countries whether they should belong to a dollar-, a euro-, or a
yen-area, assign the Central American countries clearly to the dollar-area.21
20However, there are also some voices demanding the opposite. Fern andez-Arias, Yeyati, and Mor on (2006) for
example, recommend de-dollarization for the Central American countries. Edwards and Magendzo (2003) nd that
dollarized economies grow slower than non-dollarized ones and suspect that this may be caused by diculties in
accommodating external shocks. Also Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001) are sceptical of a policy of dollarization.
Focusing on Mexico and using a calibrated general equilibrium model, they conclude that dollarization is the least
preferable option among dierent monetary policy regimes, from a welfare point of view.
21A general discussion of alternative long-run strategies for monetary policy for Latin America, including currency
boards and dollarization, is proposed by Mishkin and Savastano (2001), whereas Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger
(2002) provide a broad analysis of the issue of dollarization, both from the empirical and theoretical side.How Strong is the Case for Dollarization in Central America? 20
A recent study about the costs of macroeconomic coordination with the US for Central America
was conducted in Fiess (2007). Using dierent lters to identify the cyclical component of GDP,
he analyzes business cycle synchronization of Central America and the USA - measured by the
contemporaneous correlations between the cycles - and calculates the degree of trade integration
in DR-CAFTA with annual GDP data from 1965 - 2005 and monthly data on economic activity
from 1995 - 2005. He nds that Costa Rica has the highest business cycle synchronization with
the USA of the Central American countries, and that all of them have become more sensitive to
developments of the American economy in recent years.22
The common cycle approach of Vahid and Engle (1993), that we propose as an alternative
measure of comovement, has also been applied to (annual) output data in Central America in Roache
(2008), although not in the context of dollarization. The author analyzes annual real GDP from
1950 to 2006 in a multivariate framework including both Central American countries and the United
States. For the purpose of addressing the policy issue of dollarization, the bivariate framework,
and the extension of Cubadda (2007), allows us to clearly attribute the common cycle (or the lack
of it) to specic individual countries, such as Costa Rica and the US. The multivariate framework
is, however, useful for addressing the issue of a potential monetary union among several countries.
This has been done for instance by Cheung and Yuen (2005) in the context of a policy debate of
a potential currency union in Northeast Asia. Using the approach of Vahid and Engle (1993), the
authors nd evidence that the three Asian economies have synchronous output movements at both
long-run and short-term horizons, and thus, provide arguments in favor of a currency union.
The second part of our paper challenges the view that the OCA-Model of Mundell is the
right framework to think about the issue of macroeconomic policy coordination in middle income
countries. This line of argument is related to an earlier paper of Calvo (2001), who also argues
- within a broader discussion of pros and cons - that the optimal currency area theory omits
some important factors of emerging economies, namely recent nancial crisis, combined with the
existence of partial dollarization, imperfect credibility, weak nancial systems and contagion. Our
analysis in the second part supports his argument that the consideration of these factors can make
dollarization become more attractive.23
Our analysis also complements and extends the ndings of Gourinchas, Valdes, and Landerretche
22Ahmed (2003) points out that external shocks only play a limited role for business cycle 
uctuations. He concludes
that xed exchange rates in Latin America may not be as costly as theory predicts.
23Also, Edwards (2009) considers the degree of partial dollarization as one of the sources of macroeconomic vulnera-
bility and nancial crisis.N. Lindenberg and F. Westermann 21
(2001), who study lending boom episodes and show that in Latin America particularly, they make
the economy considerably more vulnerable to nancial crisis. A case study on the asymmetries of
the tradable and non-tradable sectors in Mexico between 1995 and 1998, i.e. the time of the recovery
from the Mexican crisis, was rst given in Krueger and Tornell (1999). Gelos and Werner (2002)
analyze a rm-level data set on Mexican manufacturing establishments and show that especially
the smallest rms are nancially constrained. A model that takes account of these credit market
imperfections in the context of exchange rate regime choice has been developed by Lahiri, Singh,
and V egh (2007).24
In our paper, we focus on stabilization policy. This focus seems appropriate in light of the
increasing evidence on the welfare cost of macroeconomic volatility in developing countries (see
for instance Loayza, Ranci ere, Serv en, and Ventura (2007)). But certainly, there are also several
other pros and cons. An overview of the broader debate is given for example in Salvatore, Dean,
and Willet (2003), especially in the chapters by Feige, Faulend,  Sonje, and  So si c (2003); Berg and
Borensztein (2003); Corbo (2003); Edwards (2003); Eichengreen (2003); Schuler (2003); and Cohen
(2003). Among the pro-arguments is that a reduction of volatility in real exchange rates helps both
foreign trade and foreign investment to increase.25 On the other side, the loss of monetary policy
- that we discussed in the context of stabilization policy - also implies that seigniorage and the
scope for acting as lender-of-last-resort are no longer possible. The second contra-argument is that
in the presence of nominal rigidities, it is hard to carry out a real depreciation, i.e. in the absence
of devaluation possibilities, external shocks result in greater costs than in non-dollarized countries.
Berg and Borensztein (2003) argue that the more unocially dollarized the economy already is,
the smaller are the costs of ocial dollarization. Eichengreen (2003) points out that the benets
depend on whether dollarization helps to speed the pace of nancial, labor, and scal reforms.
Moreover, also the number of countries that participate in the dollar area is crucial (Mundell,
2003), i.e. dollarization would be much more favorable for every single Central American country
if all countries in the region decided to adopt the dollar as legal tender. A discussion of key aspects
of the implementation of ocial dollarization is given in J acome and  Ake L onnberg (2010).
24For a theoretical model of a small open economy and the costs of dollarization see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001).
25Freund and Spatafora (2008) show that reductions in transaction costs (e.g. by reducing the exchange rate volatility)
increase remittance 
ows. Thus, one hypothesis to test would be that dollarization leads to an increase in remittances
and thus to a stabilization of the domestic economy.How Strong is the Case for Dollarization in Central America? 22
5 Conclusions
In our paper, we have focused on two model frameworks - Mundell (1961) and Schneider and Tornell
(2004) -, that can be used to address the issue of dollarization, and their opposing views about
the role of the real exchange rate. The two models guide our empirical analysis of eight Central
American economies.
The rst contribution of our paper is a methodological point on the assessment of optimal
currency areas in the Mundell framework. We emphasize that in addition to the correlation of
shocks the reaction of each country to a shock is of high relevance for a common monetary policy.
Even if the growth rates of the GDP are highly correlated, the reaction to a shock - that can be
interpreted as the business cycle - may dier signicantly across countries. We apply the test for
common serial correlation to a data set from Central America, where the topic of dollarization is
an important part of the discussion on stabilization policy. We can not conrm the existence of
a common business cycle between the GDP growth rates of Central America and the USA. Thus,
in the optimum currency area framework of Mundell (1961) dollarization would be associated with
welfare losses in terms of business cycle stabilization.
Our second point is that this framework may not be adequate for the emerging middle in-
come countries in Central America as it does not take account of the existence of credit market
imperfections. Analyzing the dollarization question in the boom-bust cycle framework of Schnei-
der and Tornell (2004), where enforceability problems and bailout expectations play a major role,
leads to a new argument in favor of ocial dollarization: in order to protect the economies from
pronounced cyclical 
uctuations (in either direction), that arise from a mismatch between foreign
currency denominated debt and domestic currency revenues, dollarization might be the appropriate
strategy.
Which one of the two models is appropriate for a particular country depends critically on the role
of the real exchange rate. The impulse response functions, generated from a vector-autoregressive
(VAR) model, indicate that an unexpected change in real exchange rate leads to a pro-cyclical
response of output, i.e. an appreciation leads to an increase and a depreciation to a decrease in
gross domestic product. This unconventional relationship - that is typical for many middle income
countries - suggests that a model with contract enforceability problems and bailout expectations,
rather than the typical OCA model, provides an appropriate conceptual framework for the countries
studied in this paper.N. Lindenberg and F. Westermann 23
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Appendix
Table A.1: Results of ADF-test for GDP data
lags statistic crit. value lags statistic crit. value
Costa Rica 
a) 4 -2.75 -3.46 0 -10.51  ** -2.95
Dominican Rep. 
a) 0 -1.10 -3.54 0 -6.167  ** -2.95
El Salvador 
b) 4 -0.51 -2.89 1 -4.958 ** -2.93
Guatemala 0 -0.75 -2.95 0 -7.712  ** -2.95
Honduras 4 -1.47 -2.89 3 -5.773  ** -2.90
Mexico 1 -1.09 -2.93 0 -4.271  ** -2.95
Nicaragua 2 -0.90 -2.92 1 -7.590  ** -2.93
Panama 
a) 1 1.43 -3.52 1 -3.051  ** -2.93
USA 0 -2.66 -2.95 1 -2.964  ** -2.93
1997:1 - 2008:1
Level 1st differences
Note: ADF-test statistics are reported for the sample 1997:1 - 2008:1 (quarterly data). The ADF-test was conducted
in levels and in rst dierences. The lag length was selected by the SIC criterion. Critical values of Cheung and
Lai (1995) were applied. ** indicate rejection of the existence of both, stochastic and deterministic, trends with a
signicance of 5%. a) A trend has been included in the estimation equation. b) For El Salvador the ADF-test in rst
dierences has been conducted with only one lag (selected manually; SIC would require 3 lags).
Source: Authors calculations, based on IADB (2010), Banco de Guatemala, and IMF (2010).
Table A.2: Results of Johansen cointegration test




a) Mexico Nicaragua Panama
USA r=0 Statistic 11.15 22.10 *** 22.54 *** 24.06 *** 26.76 ** 15.67 31.00 *** 8.99
Crit.Val. 17.20 16.40 16.40 16.40 26.12 18.08 16.40 19.15
Vector -2.13 -0.09 -1.29 -0.94 -2.44 -0.75 -0.42 0.45
r=1 Statistic 4.54 2.87 2.96 5.70 9.91 3.99 19.16 *** 3.54
Crit.Val. 10.14 9.67 9.67 9.67 15.40 10.66 9.67 11.29
1997:1 - 2008:1
Johansen Test (Maximum Eigenvalue Statistic)
Note: Results of testing for cointegration between the GDPs of the Central American countries and the USA are
shown for the sample 1997:1 - 2008:1. The Table contains the Maximum Eigenvalue statistics for r=0 and r=1. The
critical values of Osterwald-Lenum (1992) were scaled with the scaling factor of Cheung and Lai (1993) to adjust for
nite samples. ***, ** indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis with a signicance of 1%, 5%. a) To test for
cointegration with Honduras, industrial production instead of GDP has been used for the USA.
Source: Authors calculations, based on IADB (2010), Banco de Guatemala, and IMF (2010).N. Lindenberg and F. Westermann 29
Table A.3: Results of serial correlation common feature and codependence tests with 4 lags
vector CF 1 2 3
Costa Rica 0.19 *** 4.17 *** 2.01 * 1.61 1.94
Dominican Rep. 0.03 3.29 *** 1.70 1.58 1.56
El Salvador 0.18 5.14 *** 1.16 1.13 0.86
Guatemala 0.61 *** 2.11 * 0.47 0.59 0.80
Honduras 
a) 0.12 16.24 *** 4.36 *** 3.57 ** 3.22 *
Mexico 0.44 *** 2.52 ** 0.52 0.68 0.71
Nicaragua 0.29 *** 2.86 ** 2.92 ** 1.39 1.36
Panama 0.04 4.67 *** 2.54 ** 3.09 ** 3.04 *
1997:1 - 2008:1 
Codependence of order
Note: Results of the TSLS estimation of serial correlation common features and codependence between the GDP
growth rates of Central American countries and the USA are reported for the sample 1997:1 - 2008:1. Independently
of the true lag structure, all equations have been estimated with 4 lags. Error-correction terms have been included
for Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The column CF gives the F-statistic for the serial
correlation common feature test, and the columns titled codependence of order 1, 2, 3 report the F-statistic for the
codependence test. The column vector contains the coecient  of the common feature vector. ***, ** indicates the
rejection of the null hypothesis with a signicance of 1%, 5%. Please note, that in some cases the non-rejection of the
null hypothesis is trivial (e.g. as in the case of the codependence tests for Nicaragua, where both countries, Nicaragua
and the US, have a lag structure of 1). a) To test for a common feature with Honduras, industrial production instead
of GDP has been used for the USA.
Source: Authors calculations, based on IADB (2010), Banco de Guatemala, and IMF (2010).How Strong is the Case for Dollarization in Central America? 30
Table A.4: Systemic banking and currency crisis in Central America
Year Source Year Source
Belize -- -- -- --
Costa Rica  1987 B01, CK03, 
LV08
1981 LV08
1994-1997 B01, CK03, 
J08, LV08
1991 LV08
Dom. Rep. 1996 J08 1985 LV08
2003 J08, LV08 1990 LV08
2003 LV08
El Salvador 1989 CK03, LV08 1986 LV08
1998 J08
Guatemala 1991 CK03 1986 LV08
2001 J08
2006 J08
Honduras 1999 J08 1990 LV08
2001 J08
2002 J08
Mexico 1981-1982 B01,  LV08 1977 LV08
1982-1991 KR99, CK03 1982 LV08
1992 KR99 1995 LV08
1994-1997 B01, CK03, 
J08, LV08
Nicaragua 1987-1996 CK03 1979 LV08
1990 LV08 1985 LV08
2000-2002 J08, LV08 1990 LV08
Panama 1988-1989 CK03,  LV08 -- --
Systemic Banking Crises Currency Crisis
Note and Source: The Table reports the systemic banking crisis and currency crisis of Central America since the
1980s that have been reported by various authors. B01 refers to Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, and Martinez-Peria
(2001), CK03 to Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), J08 to J acome (2008), KR99 to Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), and
LV08 to Laeven and Valencia (2008).